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Abstract
An analysis of steganographic systems subject to the following perfect undetectability condition is presented
in this paper. Following embedding of the message into the covertext, the resulting stegotext is required to have
exactly the same probability distribution as the covertext. Then no statistical test can reliably detect the presence of
the hidden message. We refer to such steganographic schemes as perfectly secure. A few such schemes have been
proposed in recent literature, but they have vanishing rate. We prove that communication performance can potentially
be vastly improved; specifically, our basic setup assumes independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) covertext,
and we construct perfectly secure steganographic codes from public watermarking codes using binning methods and
randomized permutations of the code. The permutation is a secret key shared between encoder and decoder. We derive
(positive) capacity and random-coding exponents for perfectly-secure steganographic systems. The error exponents
provide estimates of the code length required to achieve a target low error probability.
In some applications, steganographic communication may be disrupted by an active warden, modelled here by a
compound discrete memoryless channel. The transmitter and warden are subject to distortion constraints. We address
the potential loss in communication performance due to the perfect-security requirement. This loss is the same as
the loss obtained under a weaker order-1 steganographic requirement that would just require matching of first-order
marginals of the covertext and stegotext distributions. Furthermore, no loss occurs if the covertext distribution is
uniform and the distortion metric is cyclically symmetric; steganographic capacity is then achieved by randomized
linear codes. Our framework may also be useful for developing computationally secure steganographic systems that
have near-optimal communication performance.
Index Terms
Steganography, watermarking, secret communication, timing channels, capacity, reliability function, error expo-
nents, binning codes, randomized codes, universal codes.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Information embedding refers to the embedding of data within a cover object (also referred to as covertext)
such as image, video, audio, graphics, text, or packet transmission times [1]–[5]. Applications include copyright
protection, database annotation, transaction tracking, traitor tracing, timing channels, and multiuser communications.
These applications often impose the requirement that embedding only slightly perturbs the covertext. The name
watermarking has been widely used to describe information embedding techniques that are perceptually transparent,
i.e., the marked object (after embedding) is perceptually similar to the cover object.
In some applications, the presence of the embedded information should be kept secret (see applications below).
Then perceptual transparency is not sufficient, because statistical analysis could reveal the presence of hidden
information. The problem of embedding information that is hard to detect is called steganography, and the marked
object is called stegotext [3], [4], [6]–[8]. Steganography differs from cryptography in that the presence of the
message needs to remain secret, rather than the value of the message. The dual problem to steganography is
steganalysis, that is, detection of hidden information within a stegotext.
A classical model for steganography is Simmons’ prisoner problem [9]. Alice and Bob are locked up in different
cells but are allowed to communicate under the vigilant eye of Willie, the prison warden. If Willie detects the
presence of hidden information in the transmitted data, he terminates their communication and subjects them to a
punishment. Willie is a passive warden if he merely observes and analyzes the transmitted data. He is an active
warden if he introduces noise to make Alice and Bob’s task more difficult.
In the information age, there are several application scenarios for steganography.
1) Steganography may be used to communicate over public networks such as the Internet. One may embed bits
into inconspicuous files that are routinely sent over such networks: images, video, audio files, etc. Users of
such technology may include intelligence and military personnel, people that are subject to censorship, and
more generally, people who have a need for privacy.
2) Steganography may also be used to communicate over private networks. For instance, confidential documents
within a commercial or governmental organization could be marked with identifiers that are hard to detect.
The purpose is to trace unauthorized use of a document to a particular person who received a copy of this
document. The recipient of the marked documents should not be aware of the presence of these identifiers.
3) Timing channels can be used to leak out information about computers. A pirate could modify the timing of
packets sent by the computer, encoding data that reside on that computer. The pirate wishes to make this
information leakage undetectable to avoid arousing suspicion. To disrupt potential information leakage, the
network could jam packet timings — hence the network plays the role of an active warden.
The channel over which the stegotext is transmitted could be noiseless or noisy, corresponding to the case of a
passive and an active warden, respectively. Moreover, the steganographer’s ability to choose the covertext is often
limited if not altogether nonexistent. In the private-network application above, the covertext is generated by a
content provider, not by the steganographer (i.e., the authority responsible for document security). Similarly in the
February 16, 2007. Revised September 30, 2007 DRAFT
3timing-channel application, the covertext is generated by the computer, not by the pirate.
In view of these applications, the four basic attributes of a steganographic code are:
1) detectability: quantifying Willie’s ability to detect the presence of hidden information;
2) transparency (fidelity): closeness of covertext and stegotext under an appropriate distortion (fidelity) metric;
3) payload: the number of bits embedded in the covertext; and
4) robustness: quantifying decoding reliability in presence of channel noise (i.e., when Willie is an active
warden).
If Alice had complete freedom for choosing the covertext, the transparency requirement would be immaterial. A
covertext would not even be needed: it would suffice for Alice to generate objects that follow a prescribed covertext
distribution. This model has two shortcomings: (a) as mentioned above, in some applications Alice has little or
no control over the choice of the covertext; (b) even if she has, covertexts have complicated distributions, and
generating a size-M steganographic code by sampling the covertext distribution would be highly impractical for
large M .
Information theory is a natural framework for studying steganography and steganalysis. Assuming a statistical
model is available for covertexts, the only truly secure strategy from the steganographer’s point of view is to
ensure that the probability distributions of the covertext and stegotext are identical. This strong notion of security
was proposed by Cachin [10] and is the steganographic counterpart of Shannon’s notion of perfect security in
cryptography. We refer to steganography that satisfies this strong property as perfectly secure.
If Alice is allowed to select the covertext and Willie is passive, Alice may use the following perfectly secure
steganographic code [10]. Alice and Bob agree on a hash function, and the value of the hashed stegotext is the
message to be transmitted. Alice searches a database of covertexts until she finds one that matches the desired
hash value. This approach is perfectly secure irrespective of the distribution of the covertext. The disadvantages are
that the search is computationally infeasible for large message sets (communication rate is extremely low), and the
underlying communication model is limited, as discussed above.
Cachin also proposed two less stringent requirements for steganographic codes [10]. One is ǫ-secure stegano-
graphic codes, where the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the covertext and stegotext probability distributions
is smaller than ǫ (perfect security requires ǫ = 0). For random processes he redefined perfectly secure steganography
by requiring that the above Kullback-Leibler divergence, normalized by the length N of the covertext sequence,
tends to zero as N → ∞. Unfortunately this does not preclude the possibility that Kullback-Leibler divergence
remains bounded away from zero, even grows to infinity (at a rate slower than N ) as N →∞. If such is the case,
Willie’s error probability tends to zero asymptotically, and therefore the perfect-security terminology is misleading.
While Cachin focused on security and not on communication performance in terms of payload, robustness
and fidelity, Kullback-Leibler divergence has become a popular metric for assessing the security of practical
steganographic schemes subject to transparency, payload, and robustness requirements [11]–[18]. Other metrics
are studied in [19]–[25].
The tradeoffs between detectability, fidelity, payload, and robustness can be studied in an information-theoretic
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4framework. The basic mathematical model for steganography is communications with side information at the
encoder [26]. Moulin and O’Sullivan studied a general information-theoretic framework for information hiding
and indicated its applicability to steganography [27, Section VII.C]. However, they did not study perfectly secure
steganography and did not derive expressions for steganographic capacity. Galand and Kabatiansky [28] constructed
steganographic binary codes, but the code rate vanishes as logN
N
. Fridrich et al. [29], [30] proposed positive-rate
“wet paper” codes, which permit a change from the original cover distribution to a new stegodistribution. However
they did not analyze the fundamental tradeoffs between payload, robustness, and detectability.
The goal of this paper is therefore to study the information-theoretic limits of perfectly undetectable steganography.
As a first step towards this problem, we assume that covertext samples are independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) over a finite alphabet. In practice the i.i.d. model could be applied to transform coefficients or to blocks
of coefficients. While this is just a simplifying approximation to actual statistics, it allows us to derive tangible
mathematical results and to understand the effects of the perfect security constraint on transparency, payload, and
robustness. Our first result is a connection between public watermarking codes [27], [31], [32] and perfectly secure
steganographic codes. Given any public watermarking code that preserves the first-order statistics of the covertext
(this property will be referred to as order-1 security), we show that a perfectly secure steganographic code with the
same error probability can be constructed using randomization over the set of all permutations of {1, 2, · · · , N}. We
use this construction to derive capacity and random-coding exponent formulas for perfectly secure steganography.
The codes that achieve capacity and random-coding exponents are stacked-binning schemes as proposed in [33]
for general problems of channel coding with side information. The random-coding exponent yields an asymptotic
upper bound on achievable error probability and therefore serves as an estimate of the code length required to
achieve a target low error probability. A stacked-binning code consists of a stack of variable-size codeword arrays
indexed by the type of the covertext sequence, and the corresponding decoder is a maximum penalized mutual
information (MPMI) decoder. The analysis is based on the method of types [34], [35].
Due to the added perfect-security constraint, capacity and random-coding exponent for steganography cannot
exceed those of the corresponding public watermarking problem. Nevertheless, we have identified a class of problems
where the covertext probability mass function (PMF) is uniform and the distortion function is symmetric, with the
property that the perfect undetectability constraint does not cause any capacity loss. One special example in the
general class is the case of Bernoulli( 12 ) covertexts with the Hamming distortion metric [36]. For the binary-
Hamming case, the perfect security condition has no effect on both the capacity and random-coding error exponent.
Steganographic capacity is achieved by randomized nested linear codes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the notation, and Section III the problem statement.
Section IV shows how perfectly secure steganographic codes can be constructed from codes with the much weaker
order-1 security. Section V presents our main theorems on capacity and random-coding error exponent. Section VI
discusses the role of secret keys in steganographic codes. Simplified results for the no-attack case are stated in
Section VII. A class of steganography problems for which perfect security comes at no cost is studied in Section VIII.
As an example of this class, the binary-Hamming problem is studied in Section IX. The paper concludes with a
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5discussion in Section X.
II. NOTATION
We use uppercase letters for random variables, lowercase letters for their individual values, and boldface letters
for sequences. The PMF of a random variable X ∈ X is denoted by pX = {pX(x), x ∈ X}. The entropy of a
random variable X is denoted by H(X), and the mutual information between two random variables X and Y is
denoted by I(X ;Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ). Should the dependency on the underlying PMFs be explicit, we use the
PMFs as subscripts, e.g., HpX (X) and IpX ,pY |X (X ;Y ). The Kullback-Leibler divergence between two PMFs p
and q is denoted by D(p||q); the conditional Kullback-Leibler divergence of pY |X and qY |X given pX is denoted
by D(pY |X ||qY |X |pX) = D(pY |X pX ||qY |X pX).
Let px denote the empirical PMF on X induced by a sequence x ∈ XN . Then px is called the type of x. The
type class Tx associated with px is the set of all sequences of type px. Likewise, we define the joint type pxy of
a pair of sequences (x,y) ∈ XN × YN and the type class Txy associated with pxy. The conditional type py|x of
a pair of sequences (x,y) is defined as pxy(x,y)
px(x)
for all x ∈ X such that px(x) > 0. The conditional type class
Ty|x given x is the set of all sequences y˜ such that (x, y˜) ∈ Txy. We denote by H(x) the empirical entropy for
x, i.e., the entropy of the empirical PMF px. Similarly, we denote by I(x;y) the empirical mutual information for
the joint PMF pxy. The above notation for types is adopted from Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [34].
We let U(Ω) denote the uniform PMF over a finite set Ω. We let PX and PNX represent the set of all PMFs and
all empirical PMFs, respectively, on the alphabet X . Likewise, PY |X and PNY |X denote the set of all conditional
PMFs and all empirical conditional PMFs on the alphabet Y . We use E to denote mathematical expectation.
The shorthands aN
.
= bN , aN

≤ bN , and aN

≥ bN are used to denote asymptotic equalities and inequalities in
the exponential scale for limN→∞ 1N log
aN
bN
= 0, lim supN→∞
1
N
log aN
bN
≤ 0, and lim infN→∞ 1N log
aN
bN
≥ 0,
respectively. We define |t|+ , max(t, 0), exp2(t) , 2t, and the binary entropy function
h(t) , −t log t− (1− t) log(1 − t), t ∈ [0, 1].
We use lnx to denote the natural logarithm of x, and the logarithm log x is in base 2 if not specified otherwise.
The notation 1{A} is the indicator function of the event A:
1{A} =

 1 A is true;0 else.
Finally, we adopt the notional convention that the minimum (resp. maximum) of a function over an empty set is
+∞ (resp. 0).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Referring to Fig. 1, the covertext is modelled as a sequence S = (S1, · · · , SN ) of i.i.d. samples drawn from
a PMF {pS(s), s ∈ S}. A message M is to be embedded in S and transmitted to a decoder; M is uniformly
distributed over a message set M. The encoder produces a stegotext X through a function fN (S,M), in an attempt
February 16, 2007. Revised September 30, 2007 DRAFT
6Secret key K
M Message
XNf
{1, ... , 2   }NR
~ p ?SX
No
φ
Sp
1Distortion D
A(      )y|x Y ^M
Attack
N
Decoder
Yes
Source
2Distortion D
S
Encoder
Fig. 1: Communication-theoretic view of perfectly secure steganography.
to transmit the message M to the decoder reliably. The covertext and stegotext are required to be close according to
some distortion metric. The distortion model is motivated by the fact that stegotext and covertext represent physical
signals (such as images, text, etc.) which can be modified to some extent without affecting perceptual quality [27].
The strength of the transparency constraint is controlled by a distortion parameter.
A steganalyzer observes X and tests whether X is drawn i.i.d. from pS . If not, Willie, the steganalyzer terminates
the transmission, and obviously the decoder is unable to retrieve M . If X is deemed innocuous, Willy may simply
forward it to the decoder. In this case, Willie is a passive warden. To be on the safe side for preventing reliable
transmission of hidden messages, Willie may want to pass X through some attack channel pY|X(y|x), thereby
producing a corrupted text Y. In this case, Willie is an active warden, and the corrupted text and the stegotext
are also required to be close according to some distortion metric. The alphabets S, X and Y for S, X and Y ,
respectively, are assumed to be identical.
The decoder does not know pY|X selected by the steganalyzer and does not have access to the original covertext
S. The decoder produces an estimate Mˆ = φN (Y) ∈ M of the transmitted message. We assume that the
encoder/decoder pair (fN , φN ) is randomized, i.e., the choice of (fN , φN ) is a function of a random variable
known only to the encoder and decoder but not to the steganalyzer. We can think of this random variable as a secret
key as in [27], [31], [32]. Note that in generic information-hiding games, this secret key provides some protection
against adversaries with arbitrary memory and unlimited computational resources [4, Section X]. In steganography,
the secret key plays a fundamental role in ensuring perfect undetectability: the covertext and the stegotext have the
same PMF when the secret key is carefully designed. The randomized code will be denoted by (FN ,ΦN) with a
joint distribution p(fN , φN ).
A. Steganographic Codes
A distortion function is any nonnegative function d : S ×S → R+ ∪{0}. This definition is extended to length-N
vectors using dN (s,x) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 d(si, xi). Let Dmax = maxs,x d(s, x). We assume without loss of generality that
d(s, x) ≥ 0, with equality if s = x.
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7Definition 1: A length-N perfectly secure steganographic code with maximum distortion D1 is a triple (M, FN ,ΦN ),
where
• M is the message set of cardinality |M|;
• (FN ,ΦN ) has a joint distribution p(fN , φN );
• fN : S
N ×M→ SN maps covertext s and message m to stegotext x = fN(s,m). The mapping is subject
to the maximum distortion constraint
d
N (s, fN(s,m)) ≤ D1 almost surely (1)
and the perfect undetectability constraint
pX = pS; (2)
• φN : S
N →M maps the received sequence y to a decoded message mˆ = φN (y).
The above definition is similar to the definitions for a length-N data-embedding or watermarking code in [27],
[31], [32], with the additional steganographic constraint of (2) which requires perfect matching of N -dimensional
distributions. Also observe that the distortion constraint is inactive if D1 ≥ Dmax, i.e., the covertext S available
to Alice plays no role. Given pS, define the set of conditional PMFs pX|S such that the marginals of pSpX|S are
equal (pX = pS) and the expected distortion between S and X does not exceed D1:
QSteg1 (pS , D1) ,
{
pX|S :
∑
s,x
pX|S(x|s) pS(s) d(s, x) ≤ D1, pX(x) =
∑
s
pX|S(x|s) pS(s) = pS(x), ∀x ∈ S
}
.
(3)
Also recall that in Def. 1, randomization of (FN ,ΦN ) is realized via a cryptographic key shared by encoder and
decoder.
Next, we define CCC and RM codes which will be used to construct perfectly secure steganographic codes.
Definition 2: (CCC Code). A length-N code with conditionally constant composition, order-1 steganographic
property, and maximum distortion D1 is a quadruple (M,Λ, FN ,ΦN ), where Λ is a mapping from P [N ]S to P
[N ]
X|S.
The transmitted sequence x = fN (s,m) has conditional type px|s = Λ(ps). Moreover, Λ(ps) ∈ QSteg1 (ps, D1).
Observe that such a code matches the first-order empirical marginal PMF of the covertext, but not necessarily
higher-order empirical marginals. Hence such a code generally does not satisfy the perfect-undetectability property.
Definition 3: (RM Code). A length-N randomly modulated code is the randomized code defined via permuta-
tions of a prototype (fN , φN ):
x = fpiN(s,m) , π
−1fN (πs,m) (4)
φpiN (y) , φN (πy), (5)
where π is drawn uniformly from the set Π of all N ! permutations and is not revealed to Willie. The sequence πx
is obtained by applying π to the elements of x.
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8Definition 4: Given alphabets S and U , a steganographic channel pXU|S(x, u|s) subject to distortion D1 is a
conditional PMF whose conditional marginal pX|S belongs to QSteg1 (pS , D1) of (3). We denote byQSteg(L, pS , D1)
the set of steganographic channels subject to distortion D1 when the alphabet U has cardinality L.
If the channel pXU|S satisfies the distortion constraint D1 but not necessarily the steganographic constraint
pX = pS, pXU|S is simply a covert channel in the sense of [27], [31]. We shall denote by Q(L, pS , D1) the set of
all such covert channels. Clearly, QSteg(L, pS , D1) ⊆ Q(L, pS, D1).
B. Attack Channels
A passive warden simply produces Y = X. An active warden passes X through a discrete memoryless channel
(DMC), producing a degraded sequence Y.
Definition 5: A discrete memoryless attack channel pY |X is feasible if the expected distortion between X and
Y is at most D2: ∑
x,y
pX(x) pY |X(y|x) d(x, y) ≤ D2. (6)
Then the joint conditional PMF is given by
pY|X(y|x) =
N∏
i=1
pY |X(yi|xi).
We denote by
A(pX , D2) =
{
pY |X ∈ PY |X :
∑
x,y
pX(x) pY |X(y|x) d(x, y) ≤ D2
}
the set of all such feasible DMCs. This set is a compound DMC family.
As an alternative to Def. 5, one may consider attack channels that have arbitrary memory but are subject to an
almost sure distortion constraint [31]–[33]. In this case, the set of feasible attack channels is given by
A′(px, D2) =
{
pY|X ∈ P
N
Y |X : Pr
[
d
N(y,x) ≤ D2
]
= 1
}
.
There are three reasons why only memoryless channels are considered in this paper. First, it is shown in [33]
that for watermarking problems, both DMCs with expected distortion and arbitrary memory attack channels with
almost sure distortion result in the same capacity formula, and the former allows a smaller random-coding error
exponent when D2 is the same. Thus, in terms of minimizing the random-coding exponent, selecting pY |X from
the compound DMC class A(pX , D2) is a better strategy for the warden than selecting pY|X from A′(px, D2).
Second, the assumption of memorylessness simplifies the presentation of main ideas. Finally, note that the proofs
for the compound DMC provide the basis for the proofs in the case of channels with arbitrary memory [32], [33].
C. Steganographic Capacity and Reliability Function
The probability of error for a randomized code (FN , ΦN ) under a channel pY |X is given by
Pe,N (FN ,ΦN , pY |X) = Pr(Mˆ 6= M), (7)
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9where the average is over all possible covertexts S, messages M , and codes (FN , ΦN ).
Definition 6: A rate R is achievable if there exists a randomized code (FN ,ΦN) such that |M| ≥ 2NR and
sup
pY |X
Pe,N (FN ,ΦN , pY |X)→ 0 as N →∞. (8)
Definition 7: The steganographic capacity CSteg(D1, D2) is the supremum of all achievable rates.
Definition 8: The steganographic reliability function ESteg(R) is defined as
ESteg(R) = lim inf
N→∞
[
−
1
N
log inf
FN ,ΦN
sup
pY |X
Pe,N (FN ,ΦN , pY |X)
]
. (9)
IV. FROM ORDER-1 TO PERFECTLY SECURE STEGANOGRAPHIC CODES
Codes with conditionally constant composition (Def. 2) and randomly modulated codes (Def. 3) play a central
role in our code constructions and coding theorems. The following proposition suggests a general construction
for perfectly secure steganographic codes: first select some deterministic prototype fN with the CCC and order-1
steganographic properties and maximum distortion D1 (Def. 2), second construct a RM code from that prototype.
In Section V we show that this strategy is an optimal one. The proof of the proposition appears in the appendix.
Proposition 1: Let (M, FN ,ΦN ) be a RM code whose prototype (fN , φN ) has conditionally constant composi-
tion, order-1 security, and maximum distortion D1. Then (M, FN ,ΦN ) is a perfectly secure steganographic code
with maximum distortion D1 and same error probability as the prototype (fN , φN ).
V. STEGANOGRAPHIC CAPACITY AND RANDOM CODING ERROR EXPONENT
The steganographic codes in our achievability proofs are randomly-modulated binning codes with conditionally
constant composition. The existence of a good deterministic prototype is established using a random coding
argument. An arbitrarily large integer L is selected, defining an alphabet U = {1, 2, · · · , L} for the auxiliary
random variable U in the binning construction. Given the covertext s and the message m, the encoder selects an
appropriate sequence u in the binning code and then generates the stegotext randomly according to the uniform
distribution over an optimized type class Tx|u,s. Proofs of the theorem and propositions in this section appear in
Appendices II-VI.
The following difference between two mutual informations:
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |XUS) , I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) (10)
plays a fundamental role in the analysis.
Theorem 1: Under Def. 1 for steganographic codes and Def. 5 for the compound attack channel, steganographic
capacity is given by
CSteg(D1, D2) = lim
L→∞
CStegL (D1, D2), (11)
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where
CStegL (D1, D2) , max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) (12)
and (U, S)→ X → Y forms a Markov chain.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in two parts. The converse part is proved in Appendix II. The direct part is a
corollary of a stronger result stated in Proposition 2 below, which provides a lower bound on the achievable error
exponent (hence an upper bound on the average probability of error) and is proved in Appendix III.
Proposition 2: Under Def. 1 for steganographic codes and Def. 5 for the compound attack channel, the following
random-coding error exponent is achievable:
EStegr (R) = lim
L→∞
EStegr,L (R), (13)
where
EStegr,L (R) , min
p˜S∈PS
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,p˜S,D1)
min
p˜Y |XUS∈PY |XUS
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
(14)
[
D(p˜S pXU|S p˜Y |XUS ||pS pXU|S pY |X) +
∣∣JL(p˜S , pXU|S , p˜Y |XUS)−R∣∣+] .
Moreover, EStegr (R) = 0 if and only if R ≥ CSteg .
Remark 1: The capacity and error exponent formulas in (11)—(14) coincide with those for public watermark-
ing [32], [33], the only difference being that here the maximization over pXU|S is subject to a steganographic
constraint. Clearly EStegr,L (R) ≤ EPubWMr,L (R) and CSteg ≤ CPubWM .
Remark 2: Proposition 2 is proved using a random binning technique. First we establish the existence of a
deterministic prototype CCC code with order-1 steganographic property, maximum distortion D1, and error exponent
ESteg(R). The decoder is an MPMI decoder. The main steps in this part of the proof are similar to those in the proof
of Theorem 3.2 in [33], with the additional order-1 steganographic constraint on the encoder. The second part of the
proof is an application of Proposition 1: random modulation of the CCC prototype code yields a perfectly-secure
steganographic code with maximum distortion D1 and error exponent ESteg(R).
Remark 3. As mentioned earlier, the covertext plays no role in the special case D1 ≥ Dmax, and so Alice can
generate X independently of S. The capacity formula (11) becomes simply
CSteg = min
pY |S∈A(pS ,D2)
I(S;Y ),
and the random-coding exponent is
EStegr (R) = min
p˜S
min
p˜Y |S∈PY |S
min
pY |S∈A(pS ,D2)
[
D(p˜Y |S p˜S‖pY |S pS) + |Ip˜S p˜Y |S (S;Y )−R|
+
]
.
The binning codes are degenerate in this case; the expressions for capacity and random-coding exponents reduce to
classical formulas for compound DMCs without side information [34] and are achieved using constant-composition
codes. Further specializing this result to the case of a passive warden (D2 = 0, hence pY |X = 1{Y=X}), we obtain
CSteg = H(S) and EStegr (R) is given by (21), see Section VII.
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Fig. 2: A binning scheme with a stack of variable-size codeword arrays indexed by the covertext sequence type.
The operation of the deterministic prototype code is illustrated in Fig. 2. The codebook C consists of a stack of
codeword arrays indexed by the possible covertext sequence types. Given an input s, the encoder evaluates its type
ps and selects the corresponding codeword array
C(ps) = {u(l,m, ps), 1 ≤ l ≤ 2
Nρ(ps), 1 ≤ m ≤ |M|}, (15)
in which the codewords are drawn from an optimized type class Tu , T ∗U (ps). Each array C(ps) has |M| columns
and 2Nρ(ps) rows, where ρ(ps) is a function of the corresponding covertext type ps and is termed the depth parameter
of the array. Given y, the decoder seeks a codeword in C =
⋃
ps
C(ps) that maximizes the penalized empirical
mutual information and outputs its column index as the estimated message:
mˆ = argmax
m
max
l,ps
[I(u(l,m, ps);y)− ρ(ps)] . (16)
By letting ρ(ps) = I(u; s) + ǫ, where Tus , T ∗US(ps) is an optimized joint type and ǫ is an arbitrarily small
positive number, an optimal balance between the probability of encoding error and the probability of decoding
error is achieved. The former vanishes double-exponentially while the latter vanishes at a rate given by the random
coding error exponent in (14). The above MPMI decoder can be thought of as an empirical generalized maximum
a posterior (MAP) decoder [33, Section 3.1].
VI. SECRET KEY
In standard information-hiding problems with a compound DMC attack channel, deterministic codes are enough
to achieve capacity; random coding is used as a method of proof to establish the existence of a deterministic code
without actually specifying the code [37]. In our steganography problem, a randomized code is used to satisfy the
perfect-undetectability condition of (2). Without the secret key, a deterministic code generally could not satisfy the
perfect-undetectability condition. Also note that a randomized code is generally needed if the attacks have arbitrary
memory [31]–[33]. For example, in watermarking games, knowing a deterministic code the adversary would decode
and remove the message; deterministic codes are vulnerable to this kind of “surgical attack” [4].
February 16, 2007. Revised September 30, 2007 DRAFT
12
For randomized codes, the secret key shared between encoder and decoder is the source of common randomness.
For RM codes, the secret key specifies the value of the permutation π. The entropy rate of the secret key is
HRMK =
1
N
log2N ! < log2N. (17)
VII. PASSIVE WARDEN
A passive warden introduces no degradation to the stegotext; in this case, D2 = 0 and Y = X , i.e.,
pY |X = 1{Y=X}. (18)
This results in simplified expressions for the perfectly secure steganographic capacity in (11) and the random-coding
error exponent in (13), see Propositions 3 and 4 below. The proofs of these propositions appear in Appendices IV
and V, respectively.
Proposition 3: For the passive-warden case (D2 = 0), the maximization in (12) is achieved by U = X and
CSteg(D1, 0) = max
pX|S∈Q
Steg
1
(pS ,D1)
H(X |S). (19)
Remark. Since H(X |S) = H(X)− I(S;X) = H(S)− I(S;X), we have
CSteg(D1, 0) = H(S)− min
pX|S∈QSteg(pS ,D1)
I(S;X).
For the problem of encoding a source S subject to distortion D1, the minimum rate for representing the source is
given by the rate-distortion function
RS(D1) = min
pX|S : E d(S,X)≤D1
I(S;X) ≤ min
pX|S∈Q
Steg
1
(pS ,D1)
I(S;X)
where the inequality holds because pX|S ∈ QSteg1 (pS , D1) implies E d(S,X) ≤ D1. Hence
CSteg(D1, 0) ≤ H(S)−RS(D1) (20)
and the capacity-achieving codes for the passive-warden case are analogous to rate-distortion codes. Equality holds
in (20) if the distribution that achieves the rate-distortion bound satisfies the steganographic property pX = pS .
Proposition 4: For the passive-warden case (D2 = 0), the random-coding exponent is given by
EStegr (R) = min
p˜S∈PS
max
pX|S∈Q
Steg
1
(p˜S,D1)
[
D(p˜S ||pS) +
∣∣Hp˜S ,pX|S (X |S)−R∣∣+] . (21)
VIII. PENALTY FOR PERFECT SECURITY
The capacity expressions for public watermarking in [27], [32] and for steganography in (11) take the same form,
except that here the maximization of pXU|S is subject to the steganographic constraint. Consequently, we have
CSteg ≤ CPubWM (22)
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and similarly
EStegr (R) ≤ E
PubWM
r (R). (23)
For some special cases, it is possible that the optimal covert channel for public watermarking automatically satisfies
the perfect security condition, and (22) and (23) hold with equality. Proposition 5 below states sufficient conditions
on the covertext PMF pS and the distortion function d(·, ·) that ensure the perfect security constraint causes no
penalty in communication performance.
We consider S = Zq = {0, 1, 2, · · · , q − 1}, which is a group under addition modulo q. We shall use the
notation k , k mod q. The covertext S is uniformly distributed over Zq , i.e.,
pS = U(S).
The associated distortion function d : S × S → R+ ∪ {0} satisfies
d(i, i) = 0 and d(i, j) = d(0, j − i),
If we write {d(i, j)}q−1i, j=0 in a matrix form, the distortion matrix is cyclic-Toeplitz.
Definition 9: Let V , {0, 1, · · · , L−1}, pS = U(S), and U , {0, 1, 2, · · · , qL−1}. Given any covert channel
pXV |S ∈ Q(L, pS, D1), where v ∈ V , we define an associated covert channel pXU|S ∈ PXU|S , where U ∈ U , by
pXU|S
(
x, qv + i
∣∣s) = 1
q
pXV |S
(
x− i, v
∣∣s− i) , ∀ v ∈ V , ∀ i, s, x ∈ S. (24)
For any stochastic matrix pXV |S ∈ Q(L, pS, D1), by (24), the new channel pXU|S contains all of its q cyclically
shifted versions (with respect to X and S) and these shifted versions are equally likely. Since the distortion function
is cyclic, it is easy to verify that
EpS ,pXU|S [d(S,X)] = EpS ,pXV |S [d(S,X)] ≤ D1.
Moreover, the marginal PMF pˆX induced by pS = U(S) and pXU|S is given by
pˆX(x) =
1
q
q−1∑
i=0
pX(x− i) =
1
q
≡ pS(x), ∀x ∈ S, (25)
where pX is the marginal PMF induced by pS = U(S) and pXV |S ∈ Q(L, pS, D1). That is,
pXU|S ∈ Q
Steg(qL, pS , D1).
Definition 10: The class QStegcyc (qL, pS, D1) is the set of all such pXU|S defined in (24).
Clearly, we have
QStegcyc (qL, pS, D1) ⊂ Q
Steg(qL, pS , D1) ⊂ Q(qL, pS, D1). (26)
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Definition 11: The class of cyclic attack channels subject to distortion D2 is defined as
Acyc(D2) ,
{
pY |X ∈ PY |X : pY |X(y|x) = pY |X(y − x | 0 ), ∀x, y ∈ S,
and 1
q
q−1∑
y=0
pY |X(y|0) d(y, 0) ≤ D2
}
. (27)
Any stochastic matrix pY |X ∈ Acyc(D2) is cyclic-Toeplitz. Also note that for any pX ∈ PX ,
Acyc(D2) ⊂ A(pX , D2). (28)
Proposition 5: For the above q-ary information-hiding problem, the capacities for both the perfectly secure
steganography game and the public watermarking game are the same. That is, the perfect security constraint in (2)
does not cause any capacity loss. Moreover, there is no loss of optimality in restricting the maximization in (12)
to QStegcyc (qL, pS, D1) and the minimization to Acyc(D2):
CPubWM (D1, D2) = C
Steg(D1, D2)
= lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q
Steg
cyc (qL,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈Acyc(D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X). (29)
The proof is given in Appendix VI.
IX. EXAMPLE: BINARY-HAMMING CASE
We illustrate the above results through the following example, where S = {0, 1}, and the covertext is Bernoulli( 12 )
sequence, i.e.,
Pr[S = 1] = Pr[S = 0] =
1
2
.
The Hamming distortion metric is used: d(x, y) = 1{x 6=y}.
A. Capacity
The capacity in the public watermarking game setting is given in [33] as follows
C =


D1
dD2
[h(dD2)− h(D2)], if 0 ≤ D1 ≤ dD2 ;
h(D1)− h(D2), if dD2 ≤ D1 ≤ 1/2;
1− h(D2), if D1 > 1/2,
(30)
where dD2 = 1− 2−h(D2). When D2 = 0,
C =

 h(D1) if 0 ≤ D1 ≤ 1/2;1 if D1 ≥ 1/2. (31)
Fig. 3 shows the above two capacity functions.
February 16, 2007. Revised September 30, 2007 DRAFT
15
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
D1
Ca
pa
cit
y 
(bi
t/s
am
ple
) Passive warden: 
         D2=0 
Active warden:
     D2=0.2 
h(D1)−h(D2) 
Fig. 3: Capacity for a perfectly secure steganography game when the covertext S is a Bernoulli( 12 ) sequence.
The optimal attack channel is a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability D2. If dD2 ≤
D1 ≤ 1/2, the optimal covert channel is also a binary symmetric channel: BSC(D1) (i.e., |U| = 2, U = X , and
pXU|S = pX|S); otherwise, the capacity is achieved by time sharing: no embedding on a fraction of 1 − D1dD2
samples and embedding with the optimal covert channel BSC(dD2 ) on the rest of samples. Since the covertext S
is a Bernoulli( 12 ) sequence, the output of the above optimal BSC(p) covert channel is also Bernoulli( 12 ). That is,
the optimal covert channel for the public watermarking game satisfies pX = pS , and the perfect security constraint
does not cause any loss in capacity, as stated by Proposition 5.
B. Random-Coding Exponent
In [33], we numerically computed the random-coding exponent for public watermarking in the case of D1 = 0.4,
D2 = 0.2, and |U| = 2 as shown in Fig. 4. We found that the optimal covert channel is still a BSC(D1) (pXU|S =
pX|S) with the time sharing strategy. It implies that at least for the case of |U| = 2, pX = pS and the perfect
security constraint causes no loss in random-coding exponent either.
C. Randomized Nested Linear Codes—A Capacity-Achieving Code Construction
For information-embedding problems with a fixed attack channel BSC(D2), deterministic nested binary linear
codes were proposed to achieve capacity, where C1, a good source code with Hamming distance D1, is nested in C2,
a good channel code over BSC(D2) [38], [39]. When |C2| .= 2N [1−h(D2)] and |C1| .= 2N [1−h(D1)], the asymptotic
code rate
R = lim
N→∞
1
N
log2
|C2|
|C1|
= h(D1)− h(D2)
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Fig. 4: Random-coding exponent for perfectly secure steganography game when the covertext S is a Bernoulli( 12 )
sequence, D1 = 0.4, D2 = 0.2, and |U| = 2.
is equal to the capacity in the regime D1 ≥ dD2 . In the regime D1 < dD2 , the time-sharing strategy of (30) is
applied. These nested linear codes apply to both public watermarking and steganography because BSC(D2) is the
optimal discrete memoryless attack channel. The stegotext codewords are elements of C2 [38], [39].
In the passive-warden case (D2 = 0), we simply let C2 = FN2 , and perfect security is achieved even without
a secret key. In the active-warden case, C2 is a subgroup of FN2 , and randomization via the secret key plays an
essential role in achieving perfect security. The strategy described below makes the transmitted stegotext uniformly
distributed over FN2 . The resulting code is a randomized nested binary linear code.
Partition the whole space FN2 into a disjoint union of C2 and its cosets:
F
N
2 =
⋃
c∈Ω2
C2 ⊕ c, (32)
where C2 ⊕ c is a coset of C2, the element c ∈ Ω2 is a coset leader, and the set Ω2 contains all coset leaders. We
have
|Ω2| =
2N
|C2|
.
= 2Nh(D2). (33)
Let the secret key K be uniformly distributed over Ω2. For any k ∈ Ω2, the encoder output is defined as
x = fkN (m, s) = f
0
N (m, s⊕ k)⊕ k, (34)
where f0N (·, ·) is the deterministic encoder used for the information-embedding or watermarking problem. The
decoding function is
mˆ = φkN (y) = φ
0
N (y ⊕ k), (35)
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where φ0N (·) is the decoder associated with f0N(·).
Since the output of the deterministic encoder is uniformly distributed over C2 and the secret key K is uniformly
distributed over Ω2, the coset decomposition property (32) ensures that the randomized encoder output of (34) is
uniformly distributed over FN2 . Hence perfect security is achieved. By (33) the entropy rate of the secret key is
h(D2), unlike the log2N growth required for general RM codes in (17).
X. CONCLUSION
A strict definition of perfect security has been adopted in this paper, implying that even a warden with unlimited
computational resources is unable to reliably detect the presence of a hidden message. We have studied the Shannon-
theoretic limits of communication performance under this perfect-security requirement and studied the structure of
codes that asymptotically achieve those limits. The main results are summarized below.
• Perfectly secure steganography is closely related to the public watermarking problem of [27], [33]. Positive
capacity and random-coding exponents are achieved using stacked-binning codes and an MPMI decoder.
• Randomized codes are generally needed to achieve perfect security. The common randomness is provided
by a secret key shared between the encoder and decoder. For i.i.d. covertexts, Proposition 1 shows that
perfectly secure steganographic codes can be constructed using randomized permutations of a prototype CCC
watermarking code that merely has an order-1 security property, i.e., the prototype code matches the first-order
marginals of the covertext and stegotext, but not the full N -dimensional statistics.
• The cost of perfect security in terms of communication performance is the same as the cost of order-1 security.
However, if the covertext distribution is uniform and the distortion metric is cyclically symmetric, the security
constraint does not cause any loss of performance.
Computational Security. This paper has focused on the interplay between communication performance and
information-theoretic security, where security is achieved using a private key that is uniformly distributed over a
group Gsub. A more practical setup would involve a public-key system, in which a reduced set of representers of
Gsub is selected, each corresponding to a value of the key. Assume that the uniform distribution over this reduced
set is computationally indistinguishable (in a sense to be precisely defined) from the uniform distribution over
Gsub. The resulting steganographic code is no longer perfectly secure but inherits the computational security of
the key generation mechanism. Thus the framework analyzed in this paper can form the basis for constructing
computationally secure steganographic codes that have near-optimal communication performance.
Extensions. Our basic framework can also be used to analyze complex problems involving covertexts with Markov
dependencies and covertexts defined over continuous alphabets [40, Sec. X]. While such extensions are technically
challenging, we hope that the mathematical structure of optimal codes identified in this paper under simplifying
assumptions will shed some light on the development of practical codes with high communication performance.
February 16, 2007. Revised September 30, 2007 DRAFT
18
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROP 1
First we verify the perfect security condition. For RM codes (Def. 3), we have
pX|pi,S,M (x|π, s,m) = 1{pix=fN (pis,m)}.
Also note that for any x, z ∈ Ts, there exists a permutation π0 such that x = π0z. Hence the value of the sum∑
pi 1{pix=z} is independent of z (conditioned on z ∈ Ts), and so∑
pi
1{pix=z} =
1
|Ts|
∑
z∈Ts
∑
pi
1{pix=z} =
1
|Ts|
∑
pi
1 =
N !
|Ts|
. (36)
Hence for any type class Ts we have
pX|Ts(x|Ts) =
1
N !
∑
pi
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
|Ts|
∑
s′∈Ts
pX|pi,S,M (x|π, s
′,m)
=
1
N !
∑
pi
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
|Ts|
∑
s′∈Ts
1{pix=fN (pis′,m)}
(a)
=
1
N !
∑
pi
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
|Ts|
∑
s′′∈Ts
1{pix=fN (s′′,m)}
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
|Ts|
∑
s′′∈Ts
1
N !
∑
pi
1{pix=fN (s′′,m)}
(b)
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
1
|Ts|
∑
s′′∈Ts
1
|Ts|
1{x∈Ts}
=
1
|Ts|
1{x∈Ts}, (37)
where in (a) we have made the change of variables s′′ = πs′, and in (b) we have used (36) with z = fN (s′′,m).
From (37) we obtain
pX(x) =
∑
Ts
pS(Ts) pX|Ts(x|Ts) =
∑
Ts
pS(Ts)
1
|Ts|
1{x∈Ts} = pS(x), ∀x ∈ S
N ,
hence the perfect security condition (2) is satisfied.
Now verifying the maximum-distortion constraint (1), for every π we have
d
N (s, fpiN (s,m))
(a)
= dN (s, π−1fN (πs,m))
(b)
= dN (πs, fN(πs,m))
(c)
≤ D1
where (a) uses the definition of fpiN in (4), (b) holds because the distortion measure is additive, and (c) holds because
of our initial assumption on the prototype fN . Therefore (1) holds.
Finally, let us evaluate the error probability for the RM code. Since the covertext source and the attack channel
are memoryless, we have
pNS (s) = p
N
S (πs) and p
N
Y |X(y|x) = p
N
Y |X(πy|πx) (38)
for any permutation π. The error probability for the prototype code takes the form
Pe,N (fN , φN , pY |X) =
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈SN
pNS (s)
∑
x∈SN
1{x=fN (s,m)}
∑
y∈SN
pNY |X(y|x)1{φN (y) 6=m}.
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For the prototype code modulated with permutation π, we have
Pe,N (f
pi
N , φ
pi
N , pY |X) =
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈SN
pNS (s)
∑
x∈SN
1{pix=fN (pis,m)}
∑
y∈SN
pNY |X(y|x)1{φN (piy) 6=m}
(a)
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
s∈SN
pNS (πs)
∑
x∈SN
1{pix=fN (pis,m)}
∑
y∈SN
pNY |X(πy|πx)1{φN (piy) 6=m}
(b)
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
pi−1s′∈SN
pNS (s
′)
∑
pi−1x′∈SN
1{x′=fN (s′,m)}
∑
pi−1y′∈SN
pNY |X(y
′|x′)1{φN (y′) 6=m}
(c)
=
1
|M|
∑
m∈M
∑
s′∈SN
pNS (s
′)
∑
x′∈SN
1{x′=fN (s′,m)}
∑
y′∈SN
pNY |X(y
′|x′)1{φN (y′) 6=m}
= Pe,N (fN , φN , pY |X), (39)
where (a) holds because of (38), (b) is obtained using the change in variables s′ = πs, x′ = πx, y′ = πy, and (c)
holds because the three sums run over all elements (s′,x′,y′) of SN × SN × SN , and so the order of summation
is inconsequential. Since (39) holds for every permutation π, the error probability for the RM code is equal to
Pe,N (FN ,ΦN , pY |X) =
1
N !
∑
pi
Pe,N (f
pi
N , φ
pi
N , pY |X) = Pe,N (fN , φN , pY |X).
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX II
CONVERSE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The converse is an extension of the proof in [33, Section 7]. Our upper bound on achievable rates is derived by
• replacing the perfect-security constraint with a weaker order-1 security constraint on the encoder:
px = ps ∀m, s,x = fN(s,m) (40)
(matching the types of input s and output x = fN (s,m) of the encoder fN ),
• replacing the almost-sure distortion constraint with an expected distortion constraint on the encoder:
1
|M|
∑
s∈SN
pNS (s) d
N (s, fN(s,m)), (41)
• and providing the decoder with knowledge of the attack channel pY |X .
Clearly any upper bound we derive under these assumptions is an upper bound on capacity as well.
For any rate-R code (fN , φN ) and DMC pY |X ∈ A(pX , D2), we have
NR = H(M) = H(M |Y) + I(M ;Y)
≤ 1 + Pe(fN , φN , p
N
Y |X)NR+ I(M ;Y),
where the inequality is due to Fano’s inequality. In order for Pe not to be bounded away from 0, rate R needs to
satisfy
NR− 1 ≤ min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
I(M ;Y). (42)
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The joint PMF of (M,S,X,Y) is given by
pMSXY|fN = pM p
N
S p
N
Y |X 1{X=fN (S,M)}. (43)
Owing to (43), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ N , (M,S, {Yj}j 6=i)→ Xi → Yi forms a Markov chain and so does
(Wi, Si)→ Xi → Yi, (44)
where the random variable Wi is defined as
Wi = (M,Si+1, · · · , SN , Y1, · · · , Yi−1). (45)
Using the same set of inequalities as in [26, Lemma 4], we obtain
I(M ;Y) ≤
N∑
i=1
[I(Wi;Yi)− I(Wi;Si)]. (46)
We define a time sharing random variable T , which is uniformly distributed over {1, · · · , N} and independent
of all other random variables, and define the quadruple of random variables (W,S,X, Y ) as (WT , ST , XT , YT ).
With this definition, the order-1 security constraint (40) becomes pX = pS , and the expected distortion constraint
(41) becomes ∑s,x pS(s)pX|S(x|s) d(s, x) ≤ D1. Therefore pX|S ∈ QSteg1 (pS , D1).
By (45), the random variable W is defined over an alphabet of cardinality exp2 {N [R+ log |S| ]}. Moreover
(W,S)→ X → Y forms a Markov chain. Combining (42) and (46), we further derive
R ≤
1
N
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
I(M ;Y)
≤
1
N
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
N∑
i=1
[I(Wi;Yi)− I(Wi;Si)]
= min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
[I(W ;Y |T )− I(W ;S|T )]
= min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
[I(W,T ;Y )− I(W,T ;S)− I(T ;Y ) + I(T ;S)]
≤ min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)] , (47)
where U = (W,T ) is defined over an alphabet of cardinality
L(N) = N exp2{N [R+ log |S| ]}, (48)
and the last inequality is due to I(T ;Y ) ≥ 0 and I(T ;S) = 0 (since T is independent of S). Since pX|S ∈
QSteg1 (pS , D1), we have pXU|S ∈ QSteg(L(N), pS , D1).
Recall that JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) , I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S) when |U| = L, and that
CStegL , max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X).
Following the same arguments as in [33], the sequence CStegL is nondecreasing and converges to a finite limit
CSteg , lim
L→∞
CStegL = lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X).
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Therefore, continuing with (47), R is bounded by
R ≤ min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;S)]
= min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(N)(pX , pXU|S , pY |X)
≤ sup
L
max
pUX|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S, pY |X)
= lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X)
= CSteg. (49)
This proves the converse part of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We have
EStegr,L (R) ≤ E
PubWM
r,L (R).
Recall from [33, Lemma 3.1] that the sequence EPubWMr,L (R) is nondecreasing and converges to a finite limit
EPubWMr (R) as L→∞. Using the same arguments as in [33, Lemma 3.1], it follows that the sequence EStegr,L (R)
is nondecreasing and converges to a finite limit EStegr (R) as L → ∞. Hence for any ǫ > 0 and R, there exists
L(ǫ) such that
EStegr,L (R) ≥ E
Steg
r (R)− ǫ, ∀L ≥ L(ǫ).
We next prove that for any L, a sequence of deterministic codes (fN , φN ) with order-1 steganographic security
exist with the property that
lim
N→∞
[
−
1
N
log max
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
Pe(fN , φN , pY |X)
]
= EStegr,L (R).
To prove the existence of such a code, we construct a random ensemble C of binning codes (fN , φN ) with auxiliary
alphabet U , {1, 2, · · · , L} and show that the error probability averaged over C vanishes at rate EStegr,L (R) as N
goes to infinity. The proof is based on that of [33, Theorem 3.2] with special treatment on the encoder construction
for perfect security.
Assume that R < CStegL − ǫ. For any covertext type ps and conditional type pxu|s, define the function
EL,N(R, ps, pxu|s) , min
py|xus
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
[
D(ps pxu|s py|xus||pS pxu|s pY |X)
+|I(u;y)− I(u; s)− ǫ−R|+
]
. (50)
Define QSteg(N,L, ps, D1) as the set of conditional types px|us that also belong to the set QSteg(L, ps, D1) of
feasible steganographic channels. If px|us ∈ QSteg(N,L, ps, D1) then
(1) px = ps, i.e., the stegotext sequence has the same type as the covertext sequence and the order-1 security
condition is satisfied;
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(2) dN (x, s) ≤ D1, i.e., distortion is no greater than D1 for any choice of s and m.
The set QSteg(N,L, ps, D1) includes px|us = 1{x=s} and is therefore nonempty.
Now denote by px|us the maximizer of (50) over the set QSteg(N,L, ps, D1). As a result of this optimization,
we may associate
• to any covertext type ps, a type class T ∗U (ps) , Tu and a mutual information I∗US(ps) , I(u; s);
• to any covertext sequence s, a conditional type class T ∗
U|S(s) , Tu|s;
• to any sequences s and u ∈ T ∗US(ps), a conditional type class T ∗X|US(u, s) , Tx|us.
A random codebook C is the union of codeword arrays C(ps) indexed by the covertext sequence type ps. Let
ρ(ps) , I
∗
US(ps)+ ǫ. The codeword array C(ps) is obtained by drawing 2N(R+ρ(ps)) random vectors independently
and uniformly from the corresponding type class T ∗U (ps), and arranging them in an array with 2Nρ(ps) rows and
2NR columns indexed by messages.
A. Encoder fN
Given a codebook C, a covertext sequence s, and a message m, the encoder finds in C(ps) an l such that
u(l,m) ∈ T ∗
U|S(s). If more than one such l exists, pick one of them randomly (with uniform distribution). Let
u = u(l,m). If no such l is available, the encoder declares an error and draws u from the uniform distribution over
the conditional type class T ∗U|S(s). Then x is drawn from the uniform distribution over the conditional type class
T ∗
X|US(u, s). Recalling the discussion below (50), fN satisfies both the order-1 steganographic security constraint
and the maximum distortion constraint.
B. Decoder φN
Given y and the same codebook C used by the encoder, the decoder first seeks a covertext type ps and uˆ ∈ C(ps)
that maximizes the penalized mutual information criterion
max
ps
max
u∈C(ps)
[I(u;y) − ρ(ps)]. (51)
The decoder then outputs the column index mˆ that corresponds to uˆ. If there exist maximizers with more than one
column index, the decoder declares an error.
C. Error Probability Analysis
The probability of error is given by
Pe,N , max
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
Pr(M 6= Mˆ) = max
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
Pe(fN , φN , pY |X).
Following the steps in [33, Section 5], the encoding error vanishes double-exponentially and only the decoding
error contributes to Pe,N on the exponential scale:
Pe,N

≤ exp2
{
−N min
ps
max
pxu|s
EL,N (R, ps, pxu|s)
}
. (52)
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As N →∞, by [33, Lemma 2.2], the above error exponent converges to
EStegr,L (R) = min
p˜S∈PS
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,p˜S,D1)
min
p˜Y |XUS∈PY |XUS
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)[
D(p˜S pXU|S p˜Y |XUS ||pS pXU|S pY |X) +
∣∣JL(p˜S , pXU|S , p˜Y |XUS)−R∣∣+] . (53)
Clearly, EStegr,L (R) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if the following conditions are met:
• the minimizing PMF p˜S is equal to pS ;
• the minimizing conditional PMF p˜Y |XUS is equal to pY |X ; and
• R ≥ maxpXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)minpY |X∈A(pX ,D2) JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) = C
Steg
L .
Therefore, EStegr,L (R) > 0 and the error probability vanishes for any R < C
Steg
L (D1, D2). This implies that the
capacity is lower-bounded by
lim
L→∞
CStegL (D1, D2).
D. Perfect Security
Having established the achievability of EStegr,L (R) and C
Steg
L for a deterministic code (fN , φN ) with order-1
security and maximum distortion D1, we invoke Proposition 1 to claim that the randomly modulated code with
prototype (fN , φN ) achieves the same error probability (hence error exponent) and distortion as the prototype.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
By (18), JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) is reduced to
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) = I(U ;X)− I(U ;S).
Coosing U = X yields the lower bound
CSteg(D1, 0) ≥ max
pX|S∈Q
Steg
1
(pS ,D1)
I(X ;X)− I(X ;S)
= max
pX|S∈Q
Steg
1
(pS ,D1)
H(X |S). (54)
On the other hand,
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) = I(U ;X)− I(U ;S)
≤ I(U ;X |S) (55)
= H(X |S)−H(X |U, S)
≤ H(X |S). (56)
Note that (55) follows from the chain rule of mutual information
I(U ;XS) = I(U ;X) + I(U ;S|X) = I(U ;S) + I(U ;X |S)
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and I(U ;S|X) ≥ 0. Choosing U = X achieves equality in both (55) and (56).
From (56), we obtain
CSteg(D1, 0) = lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X)
≤ lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
H(X |S)
= max
pX|S∈QSteg(pS ,D1)
H(X |S). (57)
Combining (54) and (57) yields (19) and proves the proposition.
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Since pY |X = 1{Y=X}, the term D(p˜S pXU|S p˜Y |XUS ||pS pXU|S pY |X) in (14) is infinite if p˜Y |XUS 6= pY |X .
Hence, the minimizing p˜Y |XUS in (14) is given by
p˜∗Y |XUS = pY |X = 1{Y=X}.
Consequently, the two terms of the cost function of (14) are reduced to
D(p˜S pXU|S p˜
∗
Y |XUS ||pS pXU|S pY |X) = D(p˜S ||pS)
and ∣∣∣JL(p˜S , pXU|S, p˜∗Y |XUS)−R∣∣∣+ = ∣∣JL(p˜S , pXU|S , pY |X)−R∣∣+ ,
respectively. This yields
EStegr (R) = min
p˜S∈PS
[
D(p˜S ||pS) + lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,p˜S,D1)
|JL(p˜S , pXU|S , pY |X)− R|
+
]
. (58)
Similarly to the steps in the proof of Proposition 3, we derive that
∀ L ≥ 2 : max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,p˜S,D1)
|JL(p˜S , pXU|S , pY |X)−R|
+ = max
pX|S∈Q
Steg
1
(pS ,D1)
|Hp˜S ,pX|S (X |S)−R|
+. (59)
The maximum on the left side is achieved by U = X . Combining (58) and (59) proves the proposition.
APPENDIX VI
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
We prove Proposition 5 in two parts. We first establish that the right-hand side of (29) is an upper bound on
the public watermarking capacity CPubWM . Then we prove that the right-hand side of (29) is at the same time a
lower bound on the perfectly secure steganographic capacity CSteg .
We start with the following lemma on the properties of pXU|S ∈ QStegcyc (qL, pS , D1), which are used throughout
this proof.
Lemma 1: Any pXU|S ∈ QStegcyc (qL, pS , D1) generated by (24) from its corresponding pXV |S ∈ Q(L, pS , D1)
has the following properties:
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(i) pS|U
(
s
∣∣qv + i) = pS|V (s− i∣∣v), ∀ i, s ∈ S and ∀ v ∈ V ;
(ii) pX|U
(
x
∣∣qv + i) = pX|V (x− i∣∣v), ∀ i, x ∈ S and ∀ v ∈ V ;
(iii) pU (qv + i) = 1q pV (v), ∀ i ∈ S, v ∈ V , where pU (resp. pV ) is the marginal PMF of U (resp. V ) induced
from pXU|S (resp. pXV |S) and pS = U(S); and
(iv) pˆX = U(S), where pˆX is the marginal PMF of X induced from pXU|S and pS = U(S).
It is straightforward to verify Lemma 1(i)-(iv) from (24).
A. Upper Bound
For the capacity of the public watermarking game,
CPubWM (D1, D2) = lim
L→∞
max
pXV |S∈Q(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXV |S , pY |X)
≤ lim
L→∞
max
pXV |S∈Q(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈Acyc(D2)
JL(pS , pXV |S , pY |X), (60)
since Acyc(D2) ⊂ A(pX , D2) by (28).
Given any pXV |S ∈ Q(L, pS, D1) and its associated pXU|S ∈ QStegcyc (qL, pS, D1), we first verify that
I(S;U) = I(S;V ). (61)
From pS = U(S) and pXV |S , we obtain
H(S|V ) = −
L−1∑
v=0
pV (v)
q−1∑
s=0
pS|V (s|v) log pS|V (s|v). (62)
From pS = U(S) and pXU|S , we have
H(S|U) = −
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
q−1∑
s=0
pU (qv + i) pS|U (s|qv + i) log pS|U (s|qv + i)
= −
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
q−1∑
s=0
1
q
pV (v) pS|V
(
s− i
∣∣v) log pS|V (s− i∣∣v) (63)
=
1
q
q−1∑
i=0
H(S|V ) = H(S|V ), (64)
where (63) is obtained by using Lemma 1(i) and (iii). Since I(S;U) = H(S)−H(S|U) and I(S;V ) = H(S)−
H(S|V ), (61) follows from (64).
For the pair
(
pXV |S , pY |X
)
∈ Q(L, pS , D1)×Acyc(D2) and its associated pair
(
pXU|S , pY |X
)
∈ QStegcyc (qL, pS , D1)×
Acyc(D2), we have the following lemma that is proved in Appendix VII.
Lemma 2:
IpS ,pXV |S,pY |X (Y ;V ) ≤ IpS ,pXU|S ,pY |X (Y ;U). (65)
From (61), Lemma 2, and the definition of JL in (10), we obtain
JL(pS , pXV |S , pY |X) ≤ JqL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X), (66)
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which yields
lim
L→∞
max
pXV |S∈Q(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈Acyc(D2)
JL(pS , pXV |S , pY |X)
≤ lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q
Steg
cyc (qL,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈Acyc(D2)
JqL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X). (67)
Therefore, (60) and (67) yield
CSteg(D1, D2) ≤ C
PubWM (D1, D2)
≤ lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q
Steg
cyc (qL,pS ,D1)
min
pY |X∈Acyc(D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S, pY |X). (68)
B. Lower Bound
Using the same argument at the end of Appendix II for the sequence {CStegL (D1, D2)}, we can argue that the
sequence {CPubWML (D1, D2)} is also nondecreasing and bounded by log |S|. Therefore, {CPubWML (D1, D2)} and
any of its subsequences converge to the same limit. That is
CPubWM (D1, D2) = lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X)
= lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q(qL,pS ,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X). (69)
Similarly,
CSteg(D1, D2) = lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(L,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X)
= lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈QSteg(qL,pS ,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X). (70)
From (26),
QStegcyc (qL, pS, D1) ⊂ Q
Steg(qL, pS , D1) ⊂ Q(qL, pS, D1).
Thus, we have
CPubWM (D1, D2) ≥ C
Steg(D1, D2)
≥ lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q
Steg
cyc (qL,pS ,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X). (71)
Given pY |X ∈ A(pX , D2), we define q conditional PMFs:
pmY |X(y|x) = pY |X(y −m|x−m), ∀x, y ∈ S, 0 ≤ m < q. (72)
Since the distortion matrix {d(i, j)}q−1i, j=0 is cyclic, it is easy to verify that all the q conditional PMFs pmY |X ∈
A(pX , D2).
February 16, 2007. Revised September 30, 2007 DRAFT
27
The conditional PMF pm
Y |U induced by
(
pXU|S , p
m
Y |X
)
∈ QStegcyc (qL, pS, D1)×A(pX , D2) is given by
pmY |U (y|qv + i) =
q−1∑
x=0
pX|U (x|qv + i)p
m
Y |X(y|x)
=
q−1∑
x=0
pX|U (x|qv + i)pY |X(y −m|x−m) (73)
=
q−1∑
x=0
pX|V (x − i|v)pY |X(y −m|x−m) (74)
=
q−1∑
x=0
pX|U (x −m|qv + i−m)pY |X(y −m|x−m) (75)
= pY |U (y −m|qv + i−m), ∀ y, i ∈ S, v ∈ V , (76)
where (73) follows from the definition (72), and both (74) and (75) follow by applying Lemma 1(ii). We also obtain
the marginal PMF of Y as
pmY (y) =
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
pU (qv + i)p
m
Y |U (y|qv + i)
=
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
pU (qv + i−m)pY |U (y −m|qv + i−m) (77)
= pY (y −m), ∀ y ∈ S, (78)
where (77) follows from Lemma 1(iii) and (76).
From (76) and (78), we obtain
IpS ,pXU|S,pY |X (Y ;U) = IpS ,pXU|S ,pmY |X (Y ;U) (79)
and hence
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) = JL(pS , pXU|S , p
m
Y |X), (80)
for 0 ≤ m < q.
Let p¯Y |X , 1q
∑q−1
m=0 p
m
Y |X . It is easy to check that p¯Y |X ∈ Acyc(D2). Also,
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X) =
1
q
q−1∑
m=0
JL(pS , pXU|S , p
m
Y |X) (81)
≥ JL
(
pS , pXU|S ,
1
q
q−1∑
m=0
pmY |X
)
= JL(pS , pXU|S , p¯Y |X), (82)
where the inequality comes from the fact that for fixed pS and pXU|S , JL(pS , pXU|S, pY |X) is convex in pY |X [27,
Proposition 4.1(iii)]. Therefore, from (82) we have
CPubWM (D1, D2) ≥ C
Steg(D1, D2)
≥ lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q
Steg
cyc (qL,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈A(pX ,D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X)
≥ lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q
Steg
cyc (qL,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈Acyc(D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X). (83)
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Combining the upper bound inequality in (68) and the lower bound inequality in (83), we prove the claim
CPubWM (D1, D2) = C
Steg(D1, D2)
= lim
L→∞
max
pXU|S∈Q
Steg
cyc (qL,pS,D1)
min
pY |X∈Acyc(D2)
JL(pS , pXU|S , pY |X), (84)
which means that the perfectly secure steganographic constraint does not cause any capacity loss.
APPENDIX VII
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
For the pair
(
pXV |S , pY |X
)
∈ Q(L, pS , D1)×Acyc(D2), the conditional PMF of Y given V is
pY |V (y|v) =
q−1∑
x=0
pX|V (x|v) pY |X(y|x)
=
q−1∑
x=0
pX|V (x|v) pY |X(y − x| 0), ∀ y ∈ S, v ∈ V , (85)
where (85) follows from (27) in Definition 11 for pY |X ∈ Acyc(D2). The conditional entropy of Y given V is
H(Y |V ) = −
L−1∑
v=0
pV (v)
q−1∑
y=0
pY |V (y|v) log pY |V (y|v). (86)
For the associated pair
(
pXU|S , pY |X
)
∈ QStegcyc (qL, pS , D1)×Acyc(D2), the conditional PMF of Y given U is
pY |U (y|qv + i) =
q−1∑
x=0
pX|U (x|qv + i)pY |X(y|x)
=
q−1∑
x=0
pX|V
(
x− i
∣∣v) pY |X (y − i− (x− i) ∣∣∣ 0) (87)
= pY |V (y − i|v), ∀ y, i ∈ S, v ∈ V , (88)
where to obtain (87) we have used Lemma 1(ii) and (27) in Definition 11 for pY |X ∈ Acyc(D2); and (88) follows
from (85). The marginal PMF of Y is given by
pˆY (y) =
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
pU (qv + i) pY |U (y|qv + i)
=
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
1
q
pV (v) pY |V (y − i|v) (89)
=
1
q
q−1∑
j=0
pY (j − i) =
1
q
, (90)
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where (89) follows from Lemma 1(iii) and (88). The conditional entropy of Y given U is
H(Y |U) = −
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
pU (qv + i)
q−1∑
y=0
pY |U (y|qv + i) log pY |U (y|qv + i)
= −
L−1∑
v=0
q−1∑
i=0
1
q
pV (v)
q−1∑
y=0
pY |V (y − i|v) log pY |V (y − i|v) (91)
=
1
q
q−1∑
j=0
H(Y |V ) = H(Y |V ), (92)
where (91) follows from Lemma 1(iii) and (88), and (92) follows from (86).
Since pˆY (y) = 1q for any y ∈ S as shown in (90), we have
HpˆY (Y ) ≥ HpY (Y ), (93)
where pˆY and pY are the marginal PMF of Y for
(
pS, pXU|S , pY |X
)
and
(
pS , pXV |S , pY |X
)
, respectively. Therefore,
from (92) and (93), we obtain
I(Y ;U) = HpˆY (Y )−H(Y |U) (94)
≥ HpY (Y )−H(Y |V ) (95)
= I(Y ;V ). (96)
Hence, Lemma 2 is proved.
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